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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ALAN REED FITZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040552-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Fitz did not act in self-defense? "A defendant 
is entitled to an acquittal if based upon the whole evidence in the case there is a 
reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense." State v. 
Jackson, 528 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 1974). See also, State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 
(Utah 1980) (defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to acquittal if 
there is any basis in the evidence sufficient to create reasonable doubt). When reviewing 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence from a bench trial this Court will reverse if 
the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if this Court "otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Strieby, 
790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). "This standard of review is less 
deferential than that applied in a jury trial because of the multi-member versus single fact 
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finder, and requires that the evidence presented not be contrary to the verdict." Id. (citing 
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988)). 
This issue was preserved in an oral motion for directed verdict (R.41 at 31-38) and 
during closing argument (R. 41 at 83-90). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-402 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to 
the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend 
himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. 
However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person as a result of the 
other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of a forcible 
felony. 
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of 
fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors: 
( a ) the nature of the danger; 
(b ) the immediacy of the danger; 
( c ) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or 
serious bodily injury 
( d ) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and 
( e ) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship 
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Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109.1 
(2) A person is guilty of child abuse is the person: 
( c ) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(2)(a) or (b), commits an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child. 
(3)(b) A person who violates Subsection (2)( c ) is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-36-1(2) 
"Domestic violence" means any criminal offense involving violence or physical 
harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt, conspiracy, or 
solicitation to commit a criminal offense involving violence of physical harm, 
when committed by one cohabitant against another. "Domestic violence also 
means commission or attempt to commit, any of the following offenses by one 
cohabitant against another: 
(b) assault, as described in Section 76-5-102.... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Alan Reed Fitz appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Fourth District Court after he was convicted of assault, a class B misdemeanor, and 
domestic violence in the presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Alan Fitz was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on October 29, 
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2003, with assault, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-
102(1); domestic violence in the presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109. l(2)c), and reckless endangerment, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-112 (R. 9). 
On April 21, 2004, a bench trial was held before the Honorable Derek P. Pullan 
(R. 23-24, 41). At the close of the State's case, Fitz motioned the trial court for a directed 
verdict on all counts (R. 41 at 31-38). After deliberation, Judge Pullan denied the motion 
as to count I (assault) and count II (domestic violence in the presence of a child) and 
dismissed count III (reckless endangerment) (R. 23, 41 at 50-52). 
After presentation of all the evidence, Fitz argued to the trial court that the State 
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense and that 
therefore, he must be acquitted on the assault charge. (R. 41 at 83-90). Fitz also argued, 
accordingly, that if he had not committed any underlying criminal act then he could not be 
convicted of committing domestic violence in the presence of a child (R. 41 at 90). After 
taking the matter under advisement, Judge Pullan convicted Fitz on both charged finding 
that "the State has met its burden of proof that they have convinced me beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense" (R. 41 at 92). 
On May 26, 2004, Fitz was sentenced to 18 months court probation. As part of his 
probation, Fitz was ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $500.00 and to spend 10 days 
in the work diversion program at the Utah County Jail (R. 30-31). Fitz was also ordered 
to complete a domestic violence assessment at DCFS and to follow through with any 
recommended treatment (Id.). 
On June 25, 2004, Fitz filed a notice of appeal with the Fourth District Court (R. 
38). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Deputy JoAnn Murphy 
On September 26, 2003, at approximately 3 a.m., JoAnn Murphy and Jodi Scott, 
deputies in the Utah County Sheriffs office, were dispatched to 1803 Cedar Street, Eagle 
Mountain (R. 41 at 8-11). Brenda Fitz answered the door carrying a crying two-week old 
baby and invited the officers into the home (R. 41 at 11, 18). Brenda was also crying (R. 
41 at 13). At the time the officers came into the residence, Alan Fitz was slouched into an 
easy chair (R. 41 at 13, 21). Alan was "groggy, almost asleep" (Id.). 
Based upon the "level of agitation on the lady's face, her crying, the baby crying, 
[Deputy Murphy] determined that there appeared to have been some type of altercation 
that took place in the residence" (R. 41 at 13). Murphy testified that she was told by both 
parties-Alan and Brenda-that they were married (R. 41 at 14). 
Murphy testified that she removed Brenda from the residence and spoke with her 
outside while another deputy spoke with Alan inside the residence (R. 41 at 15-16). 
Subsequently, the deputies traded places and Murphy went inside and spoke with Alan 
(R. 41 at 16). The officers then got together and "compared notes, compared stories" 
before making a determination on how to proceed (R. 41 at 16). 
Murphy testified that Alan 
had been asleep on the couch, that his wife had been nagging him, that she 
had been yelling at him and he was trying to ignore her. He indicated that 
she reached down and slapped him [with an open hand] and he lost his 
temper, said he came off the couch and punched her several times while she 
was holding the baby 
(R. 41 at 16-17, 22). Murphy was not aware of any physical altercation which took place 
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before Brenda slapped Alan (R. 41 at 22). 
In response to a question about whether the baby was in Brenda's arms at the time 
of the altercation, Murphy testified: "In my interview with him, [Alan] stated, 'I know I 
shouldn't have done it. I just lost my temper.' He knew that she was holding the baby 
while he was hitting her" (R. 41 at 20) K However, no recording of the conversation was 
made and Murphy acknowledged that she doesn't know exactly what Alan said, but she 
believes he was acknowledging remorse for his response and his awareness that Brenda 
was holding the baby (R. 41 at 25-26). 
Murphy testified that she observed red marks on Brenda's arms and shoulders (R. 
41 at 17, 23). Murphy testified that the red marks appeared to be "defensive type of 
injuries" (R. 41 at 18). Murphy testified that she took photographs of the red marks but 
"they did not turn out" (R. 41 at 24). Murphy acknowledged that she had not seen an 
adult who has suffered a substantial injury from a punch to an arm (R. 41 at 26). 
Murphy testified that she could not recall seeing a red mark on Alan's face (R. 41 
at 26). Murphy acknowledged that people can be dazed and confused upon be awoken 
(R. 41 at 29). 
Ultimately, the officers decided that Alan was the "primary aggessor" and he was 
arrested for assault (d.v.) and domestice violence in the presence of a child (R. 41 at 16). 
Murphy identified Fitz at court but admitted on cross-examination that prior to trial 
she asked another public defender if he was Fitz (R. 41 at 21). 
Alan and Brenda divorced sometime between this incident and the trial (R. 41 at ). 
!On cross-examination, Murphy testified more specifically that "In my interview 
with him in our discussion, I asked him, 'You realize you've hit your wife while she's 
holding your child?' He stated clearly, 'I know I shouldn't have done it, but I lost my 
temper.'" 
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Brenda moved to Wyoming (R. 41 at). She was issued a subpoena but chose not to 
attend the trial (R. 17-18, 41). 
B. Testimony of Alan Fitz 
Alan testified that on the night in question, the baby awoke and Brenda got her and 
turned on the bedroom light (R. 41 at 66). This disturbed Alan and he told Brenda that he 
was going to sleep on the living room couch (R. 41 at 66). A verbal dispute started as he 
walked out of the bedroom and Brenda came out of the bedroom and was yelling at Alan 
while he lay on the couch (R. 41 at 67-68). Alan testified that he did not know how long 
the yelling continued because he "fell asleep" at approximately 2:15-2:30 a.m. (R. 41 at 
68). 
While he was sleeping on the couch, he was awaken by being struck or slapped 
across the face (R. 41 at 54). Alan testified that he woke up dazed and that he did not 
know exactly what had happened or why it happened (Id.). He initially thought he had 
been struck by an object but subsequently discovered a red mark on his face and realized 
he had been slapped by an open hand (R. 41 at 54-57). 
Alan testified that the slap hurt and that he woke up dazed and afraid that he might 
be hit again (R. 41 at 57-58). There are no lights in the living room (R. 41 at 75). 
Initially Alan thought there might be an intruder in the home (R. 41 at 58). Alan testified: 
"At first I didn't know if it was Brenda or if somebody broke in, and I got up and the first 
person I saw was Brenda. She-I don't recall if she backed up or walked-turned and 
walked forward, but she sat down in the corner of the love seat, and she had [the baby] 
next to her. I grabbed her arm and I socked her in the shoulder" (R. 41 at 63-64). The 
love seat is next to the couch in an L-formation with a path way between the two (R. 41 at 
7 
72). Alan denied telling the officers that Brenda was holding the baby but testified that 
the baby was next to her on the love seat (R. 41 at 72). The distance from where Alan 
was sleeping to the love seat is 6-10 feet (R. 41 at 73). As Alan got up from the couch, 
Brenda was moving toward the love seat (R. Rl at 75). 
Alan acknowledged that he punched her twice on the right shoulder and once on 
the left shoulder (R. 41 at 64). Alan then realized what was happening and went into the 
bedroom and locked the door until the police came (R. 41 at 64). 
Alan testified that Brenda had slapped and punched him on 8-9 different occasions 
during their 2.5 year marriage (R. 41 at 60). On each occasion she had struck him more 
than once (R. 41 at 61). Alan had to restrain her in the past when she hit him (R. 41 at 
63). On Halloween of 2001, Alan testified that Brenda was "hitting me" and she "started 
breaking things around the house, and she called the police on me, and I-you know, I've 
never hit her before" (R. 41 at 61-62). The police came and Brenda was arrested and 
taken into custody for assault (R. 41 at 64-65). Brenda also had spent 1.5 years in the 
Utah State Hospital R. 41 at (62-63). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Alan asserts that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the State proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. Alan asserts that the trial court's 
findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and that this Court should have a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made and that the evidence presented 
is contrary to Judge Pullan's verdict. Accordingly, because Alan's assault against Brenda 
was justified as self-defense, the trial court erred in convicting him of assault and of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child. For a conviction of domestic violence in the 
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presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor, an act of domestic violence must occur in the 
presence of a child. Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109.1(2)( c) . Utah Code Annotated § 
77-36-1(2) defines "domestic violence" as a criminal offense-including. Because Alan 
committed no underlying criminal offense, he cannot be guilty of domestic violence in the 
presence of a child. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE STATE HAD 
PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT ALAN'S CONDUCT WAS 
NOT JUSTIFIED AS SELF-DEFENSE. 
Alan Fitz asserts that the court erred in finding that the evidence was sufficient to 
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he did not act in self-defense. "A defendant is 
entitled to an acquittal if based upon the whole evidence in the case there is a reasonable 
doubt as to whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense." State v. Jackson, 528 
P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 1974). See also, State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) 
(defendant has no particular burden of proof but is entitled to acquittal if there is any 
basis in the evidence sufficient to create reasonable doubt). 
When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence from a bench trial 
this Court will reverse if the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
this Court "otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98, 100 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). "This 
standard of review is less deferential than that applied in a jury trial because of the multi-
member versus single fact finder, and requires that the evidence presented not be contrary 
to the verdict." Id. (citing State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988)). 
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Alan was charged with assault, domestic violence and child endangerment for 
punching his wife, Brenda, in the shoulders after she, unprovoked, slapped him across the 
face as he slept on the couch at 3 a.m. Brenda had red marks on her shoulders and arms. 
Brenda chose not to testify at trial. Alan claimed at trial that he committed no crime 
because he acted in self-defense. Judge Pullan acquitted Alan of child endangerment and 
convicted him of assault and domestic violence in the presence of a child. Specifically, 
Judge Pullan found: 
... Having considered the testimony, the Court in this matter, [notes] for the 
record that there is no question that on September 26, 2003, the defendant 
committed an act that caused bodily injury to Brenda Fitz.... The only question 
before the Court is whether or not the force used by [Alan] Fitz was lawful. 
That requires the Court to determine whether or not his acts were justified 
under Section 76-2-402 of the Utah Code. Subsection (1) of that statute provides 
that, "A person is justified in using force against another when and to the extent 
that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself against 
another's imminent use of unlawful force." 
Under that statute the defendant's belief must be reasonable as to the time 
that force is used, and to the extent that force is used. 
In determining in whether his belief was reasonable, I am to consider the 
factors set forth in subsection (5). I can also consider those same factors in 
determining whether or not continued force by Brenda Fitz was imminent. 
In this matter there is no question that Brenda Fitz committed an act of 
domestic violence, that she initiated at least the ph>sical portion of the 
confrontation by striking the defendant as he slept on the couch. The issue before 
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the Court that I have to determine is whether or not continued violence on her part 
was imminent and whether or not the defendant's belief as to the force that he used 
in response was reasonable. 
So considering the factors under subsection (5) the nature of the danger 
posed to the defendant was minimal. Ms. Fitz slapped him with an open hand on 
the face. It was a single slap. As to the immediacy of the danger, Ms. Fitz 
retreated then to the couch. She sat down immediately next to a child who had 
been born approximately two weeks earlier. 
There was no probability that the force used by Ms. Fitz would cause death 
or serious bodily injury. It's true that... that Ms. Fitz had some violent propensities 
and had engaged in prior acts of violence against the defendant. The testimony is 
that those acts occurred by way of slapping approximately every two weeks for a 
substantial period of time, and that during the two-and-one-half year marriage he 
had been punched eight to nine times by Ms. Fitz. He further testified that he hand 
never struck her. 
There was a pattern of abuse in the relationship. However, balancing the 
first three factors against those two, in considering that this event was not in 
accordance with that pattern of conduct, I am convinced that the State has met its 
burden of proof that they have convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not act in self defense. 
For that reason I am going to find the defendant guilty as to Counts I and II 
of the Information 
(R. 41 at 92-94). 
Alan asserts that the trial court's findings are against the clear weight of the 
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evidence and that this Court should reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made. Strieby, 790 P.2d at 100. "This standard of review is less deferential than 
that applied in a jury trial because of the multi-member versus single fact finder, and 
requires that the evidence presented not be contrary to the verdict." Id. (citation omitted). 
Moreover, Fitz has no burdern proof but is "entitled to an acquittal if based upon the 
whole evidence in the case there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant 
acted in self-defense." State v. Jackson, 528 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 1974). See also, State 
v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (defendant has no particular burden of proof but 
is entitled to acquittal if there is any basis in the evidence sufficient to create reasonable 
doubt). 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-402(1) states that "A person is justified in 
threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she 
reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a third person against 
such other's imminent use of unlawful force." The factors in subsection (5), referenced 
by Judge Pullan, which the trier of fact may use in its determination of imminence or 
reasonableness, are as follows: One, "the nature of the danger." Two, "the immediacy of 
the danger." Three, "the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or 
serious bodily injury." Four, "the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities." Five, 
"any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
402(5). 
Alan has marshaled the evidence in his statement of the facts and will review that 
marshaling here as necessary to his argument. 
One, Judge Pullan found "the nature of the danger posed to the defendant was 
minimal. Ms. Fitz slapped him with an open hand on the face. It was a single slap" (R. 
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41 at 93). While it is true that Brenda executed a single, open hand slap to Alan's face, 
Alan asserts that trial court ignored other pieces of evidence which are relevant to a 
consideration of the "nature of the danger." First, in the past when Brenda has struck 
Alan, she frequently struck him multiple times and that she had to be restrained (R. 41 at 
60, 61, 63). The fact that she had only slapped him once on this occasion does not mean 
that he was not in danger of more assaultive behavior from Brenda. Subsection (1) only 
requires that Alan reasonably believe that force is necessary to defend himself against 
Brenda's imminent use of unlawful force. An unprovoked slap to a sleeping individual's 
face is unlawful. Sleep, Alan asserts, is when an individual is at there most vulnerable 
and the first initial moments following a sudden (and painful) awakening are confusing 
which may affect an individual's perception of events. 
Moreover, in this case Brenda was the aggressor. The trial court correctly found 
that she committed an act of (uncharged) domestic violence and was the initiator of the 
physical confrontation (R. 41 at 93). Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-402(2)(c)(I) indicates 
that a person who is the aggressor is not entitled to make a claim of self-defense for the 
use of force. "An aggressor is one who willingly and knowingly initially provokes a 
combat or does acts of such a nature as would ordinarily lead to combat." State v. 
Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1976). See also, State v. Starts, 627 P.2d 88, 90 
(Utah 1981). Additionally, "if one who initially was a nonaggressor escalates a fight 
beyond a level which would be justified in view of the nature of the original provocation, 
then he loses the right to claim the defense of self-defense. Starks, 627 P.2d at 90 
(citation omitted). Brenda's act was one of knowing provocation that would ordinarily 
lead to combat. Alan asserts that he did not escalate the nature of the incident beyond a 
level which would be justified under Brenda's original provocation. Brenda slapped him 
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across the face while he slept. When he awoke suddenly, he was in pain and he was 
dazed. Punching her on the shoulder three times in approximately the first 6 seconds after 
he awoke (R. 41 at 58, 69) is reasonable and justified. 
Two, the trial court found that "as to the immediacy o f the danger, Ms. Fitz 
retreated then to the couch. She sat down immediately next to a child who had been born 
approximately two weeks earlier." Alan testified that when h e was getting up from the 
couch after being suddenly awakened from a blow to the face, Brenda was moving 
towards the love seat, which is next to the couch approximately 6-10 feet away (R. 41 at 
63-64, 75). The trial court failed to consider the timing and immediacy of Alan's 
response which took place in a matter of a few seconds (R. 41 at 58, 69). The fact that 
she was moving away from him in these circumstances does not negate his reasonable 
belief as to the immediacy of the danger-including whether h e was going to be struck by 
her again or initially whether there was an intruder in the home. As the aggressor, if she 
had been cited for assault, then she could only claim self-defense if she had "withdraw[n] 
from the encounter and effectively communicate[d] [to Alan her] intent to do so." Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-2-402(2)( c )(I). Brenda may have been moving away from Alan 
but it was only seconds after she assaulted him out of sleep and in the process she clearly 
communicated no intent to withdraw from the encounter. 
Three, Judge Pullan found that there was "no probability that the force used by Ms. 
Fitz would cause death or serious bodily injury" (R. 41 at 94). Alan acknowledges that 
the probability of serious bodily injury or death from a slap across the face is slight, 
however, he was in a very vulnerable position when that blow to the face unexpectedly 
occurred. In addition, the ensuing confusion from being so suddenly and drastically 
awakened likely affected his ability to perceive, in the short time between the blow and 
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his response, the likelihood of such an injury. 
Four, Judge Pullan correctly found that Brenda had violent propensities and that 
she had engaged in prior acts of violence against Alan; and that he had previously, never 
physically struck her in response. 
Five, Judge Pullan also correctly found that there was a pattern of abuse in the 
relationship. Alan asserts that the pattern was that she was the aggressor and the 
perpetrator and he was the victim. Utah Code Annotated § 77-36-1(3) defines "victim" as 
a cohabitant who has been subjected to domestic violence. 
However, Alan asserts that Judge Pullan was mistaken in finding that the first 
three factors weighed against a finding of reasonableness or imminence. Alan asserts that 
all five factors weigh in favor of a conclusion that his belief that force was necessary to 
defend himself against Brenda's imminent use of unlawful force. Alan asserts that the 
trial court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and that this Court 
should have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made and that the 
evidence presented is contrary to Judge Pullan's verdict. 
Accordingly, because Alan's assault against Brenda was justified as self-defense, 
the trial court erred in convicting him of assault and of domestic violence in the presence 
of a child. For a conviction of domestic violence in the presence of a child, a class B 
misdemeanor, an act of domestic violence must occur in the presence of a child. Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-5-109.1(2)( c ). Utah Code Annotated § 77-36-1(2) defines 
"domestic violence" as a criminal offense-including. Because Alan committed no 
underlying criminal offense, he cannot be guilty of domestic violence in the presence of a 
child. 
15 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Fitz asks that this Court conclude that trial counsel 
erred in determining that his action was not justified as self-defense pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-2-402. Accordingly, Fitz asks that this Court reverse his 
convictions for assault and domestic violence in the presence of a child because the 
evidence was insufficient to establish-beyond a reasonable doubt-that he did not act in 
self-defense. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of February, 2005. 
MARGAFfkET t. LINDS, 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, first-class mail postage pre-paid, four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to Donna Kelly, Deputy Utah County 
Attorney, 100 East Center Street, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606 this 25th day of 
February, 2005. 
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